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The transition from plan to  market in formerly socialist economies is perhaps most
fundamentally  a change  in the role of the state. The state must withdraw  from everyday  control
over most aspects  of economic  life, and the central  economic  controls associated  with the state's
central planning  apparatus must be replaced by decentralized,  objective  rules of the game, i.e.
the "rule of law".  The patron-client  networks  and the resulting  particularism  that characterized
economic  relations  under  state socialism  have  to give way to relationships  based on universalistic
rules.  The state's role must become facilitative. Its functions  in this area are twofold: (1) to
build a body of substantive  law that is clear, transparent, feasible, efficient and stable, and (2)
to create legal institutions  with sufficient  authority  and independence  to enforce these  laws (even
against the politically  powerful).
What does it take to develop such "rule of law" in transition settings? Most observers
and providers of  technical assistance focus on the supply side, i.e.  on  what key laws and
institutions  have to be in place before decentralized  markets can function. They recognize the
importance of  well-crafted  legislation and institutions that facilitate efficient and  largely
self-enforcing  economic  outcomes. However, while a supply  of key legislation  is undoubtedly
1critical, such supply is not enough on its own to ensure rule of law.  There must also be a
deep-seated  demand  for rule of law by existing  or potential  market  players. What generates  such
demand? It springs  from a desire for stability -- a desire for objective "rules of the game" that
apply  across the board rather than on a case-by-case  basis (as was typical  under socialism). This
desire in turn will arise only if these players must truly depend on the market for survival; that
is, if they no longer  view the state as an assured safety  net in times of trouble. State  intervention
can perhaps  be conducted  in an ad hoc fashion;  widespread  market interactions  among strangers,
in  contrast, depend on  reliable, objective rules to  lower transaction costs.  In  sum,  the
withdrawal  of the state may to a great extent be a sine qua non for the development  of rule by
law.
The goal of this paper is to illustrate the process and requirements for developing  rule
of law in transition  economies. It focuses on a specific  example of commercial  law reform in
each of two transition  countries, Hungary and Russia.  While each country's experience  is in a
narrow sense unique, in broader respects Hungary is quite representative  of Central Europe,
while Russia shares many characteristics  with other former Soviet republics.  While the key
problems associated with  transition in  the  two regions are  similar in  kind,  the  detailed
comparison  of Hungary and Russia  underlies  our belief that the problems  of legal development
in the two regions are different in magnitude, due to two factors: (1) different legacies and
experiences  under socialism, and (2) different degrees of state withdrawal from post-socialist
economic  activity. The shorter period of socialism  in Central Europe, its presocialist legal and
institutional  legacy, and its closer links (even during socialism)  with Western Europe ease the
2task of developing  rule of law.  The legacy is particularly important; Hungary had a well-
functioning  legal system  and rule of law before World War II, while Russia was never a society
or economy  ruled fundamentally  by law.  The highly instrumental  use of law by the Communist
Party  elite  during  the  Soviet period  further eroded trust  in  law  and  legal institutions.
Furthermore, Hungary's longer experience and  greater progress to  date in  implementing
economic  reforms that separate  private actors from the state help provide the incentives  needed
for rule of law to become  reality.
The specific  examples  of legal reform addressed  in this paper are somewhat  different  in
the two countries. This reflects in part the different  areas of concern that have highlighted  the
reform agenda in the two countries since 1992. In Russia the focus is on company  law, which
has been a primary means through which the Russian government has tried to change the
behavior  of ostensibly  privatized  firms.  In Hungary  the focus is on bankruptcy  law, which has
taken center stage as a means to change enterprise behavior  in that country since the adoption
of the transition  world's most modem and aggressive  bankruptcy  law in late 1991. Thus, each
specific  area of law reflects a major initiative of that country in trying to change enterprise
behavior in the past half-decade.' To what extent have these laws been followed in practice,
and how effective  have these initiatives  been in changing  behavior?
'  Russia has hardly begun to implement bankruptcy law, and thus it does not provide a meaningful comparison
of experience in this area to Hungary.  Hungary adopted a new company law in 1988, but it was not accompanied
by the same type of rapid privatization as in Russia, and thus it did not serve to the same extent as a tool of change.
3What is Required  for Fundamental  Legal Change?
The specific cases to be analyzed illustrate three interlocking requirements that are
essential for decentralized legal frameworks to be implemented effectively  in any setting --
reasonable laws, adequate institutions, and market-oriented  incentives.  All three must exist
together, and in socialist  economies  must often be built from scratch.  Developing any of the
three is a major challenge,  and progress along all three necessarily  takes time.  The question  to
ask at any point in time is not whether  there is or is not "rule of law", but whether the country
is moving  in the right direction along these three dimensions.
A Reasonable  Legal Framework
The first necessary  (but not sufficient)  condition  for the development  of "rule of law" is
a formal legal framework  that:
provides all players with clearly delineated  rights and responsibilities,  including clear
norms of fiduciary  duty;
embodies  market-friendly  economic  policies that are to a large extent "self-enforcing";
has been internalized  into local legal culture and understanding  through an airing and
acceptance  by a basically democratic  political  process; and
is reasonably well-known  by the population,  stable, and predictable  in enforcement.
This is by no means  an easy first requirement,  especially  given the wide range and scope of the
policy debate,  the  intense  political pressures,  the  shortage of  experience with  market
4mechanisms, the limited analytical skills and the fragility if not the absence of democratic
institutions  typical  of transition settings. While getting the economic  signals "right" is itself an
enormous challenge,  perhaps  even  more  difficult  is  defining principles  of  individual
responsibility,  particularly for those acting in a fiduciary capacity for others.  The socialist
system undermined the mutual trust among the people that is so essential for decentralized
markets to function,  and the state, acting  through  new laws and institutions,  must now undertake
the formidable task of reinstating that trust and of convincing  individuals  that it will also be
governed  by law.  Unfortunately,  the failure of this first step may have systemic  costs beyond
mistakes  in individual laws themselves.  When laws are passed with major inconsistencies,
uncertainties,  economic  flaws,  or clear avenues  for abuse  by some  at the expense  of others, these
new laws can act to deepen  public mistrust  in law even further.
What are the possible  sources for transition  countries  to turn to in formulating  substantive
legal frameworks? Essentially  there are two options: (1) "home-grown"  law (either from "first
principles"  or from old pre-war legislation),  as has typically  been true of most of the legislation
adopted since the late 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe; 2 or (2) legislation  transplanted  in
part or in whole from advanced  market economies. Although  imported laws have the benefit
of supplying "pre-tested" models, they are inherently risky, because they do not grow out of
local legal culture and so may not take root when transplanted  without having undergone an
internal process of formulation  and drafting. An intermediate  model--borrowing  general ideas
from "best practice" models  abroad, but then internalizing  them through  a thorough  process of
2  For specific examples, see Gray and Associates (1993).
5indigenous  legal drafting and political  debate -- is probably optimal in most cases.
Supportive  Institutions
A second  necessary  (but still insufficient)  condition  for the development  of "rule  of law'
is the existence  of institutions  capable  of supporting  the legal framework  and enforcing it at the
margin.  Even if the formal body of laws is economically  sound and potentially  self-enforcing
to a large extent, it may well lie dormant without basic institutional  support.
The first obvious supporting  institution is the court system.  For an individual or the
state, taking action to enforce a law is often time-consuming  and costly, particularly when
information  is scarce.  The potential  end result must make it worth the effort.  In particular,
there must be some assurance that the court (or other legal institution  involved) has the power
and capacity to decide the substantive  question objectively  and enforce the judgment.  These
assurances were absent under state socialism.  The administrative-command  system led to a
general marginalization  of law within the economy,  and formal  judicial institutions  atrophied  in
the economic sphere.  Managers tended to turn to ministerial  or party officials if a trading
partner reneged, rather than pursuing legal remedies.  This  was a  pragmatic approach.
Appealing  to the bureaucracy  solved their problem in that the ministry or the party had the
power to order, for example, that key inputs be delivered.  As a rule, the courts could only
award money damages and fines.  In a non-monetized  economy, such remedies were cold
comfort to enterprise managers  seeking  to fulfill  the plan. With the transition  to the market, the
remedial  role of the state  bureaucracy  must be supplanted  by arm's-length  dispute  resolution  and
6enforcement  institutions.
While formal legal institutions such as judges, prosecutors, arbitrators, and court
functionaries  (including,  for example,  bailiffs  and bankruptcy  trustees)  are of course the primary
law interpreters  and enforcers, the list of institutions  needed to undergird  the rule of law in any
country goes well beyond them.  For  arm's-length legal norms to  be useable by  market
participants in everyday commerce, perhaps the most important institutions are  those that
produce and  distribute information and  monitor those participants, i.e.  the  "watchdog"
institutions  such as accountants,  credit rating services, securities regulators, the private bar and
investigators  (including  the press). These institutions  provide the information  that is absolutely
critical for laws to be enforced (whether "self-enforced"  by  the participants themselves  or
enforced by formal institutions)  and thus for economic  policies  to have their intended  effects.
Early yet careful attention to  institutional needs is  warranted, because institutional
development is  reinforcing, as  each successful case of  law enforcement and information
provision  creates a demonstration  effect that builds  overall trust in the legal process. Institutions
do not arise in a vacuum but are themselves  shaped by the substance  of the new transition-era
laws and by  the  institutional legacies of  state socialism. 3 The state creates formal legal
institutions  through  enabling  legislation. In doing so, the goal should  be to develop institutions
that are generally  autonomous  from the day-to-day  political  process of government  and able to
operate unobtrusively. The state continues  to be involved, in that it provides financial  support
and lends its legitimacy  to these institutions  (which  can be important  when enforcing  judgments
3  For further discussion of the Leninist legacy and the path-dependent nature  of the transition to the market,
see respectively Jowitt (1992) and Stark (1992).
7against the political or economic  elite).  As to the "watchdog" institutions  that facilitate  both
official  and self-enforcement,  the state's role is more limited, both in terms of their creation  and
operation. Indeed, if such institutions  are to be successful,  they must arise from societal  demand
rather than being imposed from above by bureaucrats.
Market-Based  Incentives
Finally, a third necessary  condition  for rule of law to develop in any country is a set of
incentives for  individual market participants themselves that motivates them to  take full
advantage  both of the rights granted by the formal legal framework  and of the information  and
enforcement  capacity provided by supportive  institutions. Once again, the role of the state is
critical.  As noted earlier, parties will have strong  incentives  to take advantage  of legal rights
and abide by legal responsibilities  primarily  to the extent they depend  on the market -- and their
reputation  in it -- for survival. For example, banks and other creditors  may  not avail themselves
of the rights provided under bankruptcy  laws unless  they are convinced  that state bail-outs  are
not likely to be available and thus that aggressive debt collection is necessary for survival.
Similarly,  managers  in private firms  may be tempted  to ignore shareholder  protections  and other
checks and balances  laid out under corporate law unless their access to inputs and their ability
to sell products and raise capital depends  on a law-abiding  reputation. If they can raise capital
by turning to the government  or state banking system  for subsidies,  or if they have a monopoly
position in the market (either as output seller or as input purchaser),  why worry about reputation
in private markets?
8In sum, market-oriented  incentives  complement  market-oriented  laws and institutions.
All three are -- for better or worse -- inextricably interlinked.  One cannot proceed far without
the others, and all three are essential for the development  of rule by law.
Hungary's Experience  with Bankruptcy  Reform
To translate the rather abstract  discussion  above into real-world  relevance, let us take as
a first example  the case of bankruptcy  reform in Hungary. We look in turn at the pros and cons
of the formal  law, the state  of institutional  support  for such law, and the incentives  of the parties
supposedly  affected  by the law's provisions.
The Legal Framework:  Hungay's  Bankruptcy  Legislation
Hungary's experience  with bankruptcy  reform  since 1992  is unique  among  the transitional
economies. Hungary adopted  a tough new bankruptcy  law in late 1991 that took effect January
1, 1992. The law required managers  of all firms with arrears over 90 days to any creditor to
file for either reorganization  or liquidation  within 8 days (the so-called "automatic  trigger") and
provided a rather sympathetic framework for them to do so.
4 The law immediately resulted in
a wave of filings, with some 3500 filings in April, 1992, alone (90 days after the law took
effect). From 1992  through 1994  over 25,000 cases were filed under the law, a level far beyond
4  For purposes  of this paper, we use the term 'bankruptcy' for the entire framework  and 'reorganization' and
'liquidation'  for the two specific procedures provided in the law.  This differs from the specific Hungarian
terminology,  which used the term 'bankruptcy' to refer to the specific reorganization  procedure rather than the
broader overall  framework.
9the expectations  of policy makers when the law was adopted.
The Hungarian law provides a  modem and  quite reasonable economic and  legal
framework  for judicially-directed  reorganization  and liquidation. It is similar in structure to the
U.S.  bankruptcy regime, as policy makers imported contemporary thinking from advanced
market economies  while attempting  to tailor it to Hungarian  conditions. Under the law debtor
firms may file for either reorganization or  liquidation, while creditors may file only for
liquidation  of the debtor firm. If a debtor files  for reorganization,  incumbent  managers  may  stay
in place and have three months  to present a reorganization  plan to creditors, who then negotiate
and vote to accept or reject it.  If either  party files for liquidation,  a liquidator  is appointed  once
the court reviews and decides to proceed with the case.  The liquidator is supposed  to notify
creditors, draw up a list of assets, sell the assets, and divide the proceeds among creditors in
order or priority (with liquidation  costs first, followed  by creditors secured  by mortgage,  other
creditors, and equity holders, in that order).  The entire liquidation  process is supposed  to be
completed  within two years. The law sets compensation  levels for liquidators  and trustees, and
regulations adopted concurrently with the law provide an annual licensing procedure for
liquidators, with minimum  capital and professional  requirements.
Under the first version of the law, a debtor firm filing for reorganization received
automatic  relief from debt service  and asset foreclosures  for the first three-month  period (further
extendible  by one month),  during which  the reorganization  plan was to be prepared. Unanimous
approval by all creditors was required for the plan to be adopted; otherwise the case reverted
automatically to  liquidation.  A  firm  with  a  successful plan  could  not  file  again for
10reorganization  for at least three years. Trustees and creditors' committees  were not required in
reorganization  cases but could be organized at the discretion of creditors.
Numerous important  changes were made to the law in September, 1993, drawing from
the first one and a half years'  experience  with the 1991  law.  The unanimous  creditor  approval
requirement  was considered  too tough, so it was replaced by a requirement  of creditor  approval
by one-half  in number  and two-thirds  in value of outstanding  claims. The automatic  three-month
stay on debt service was considered too generous and easy to abuse, and it was replaced by a
discretionary  stay that required the same level of creditor  approval. Liquidators' compensation
was considered  too low and was increased. To stem the unanticipated  flood of cases, both the
"automatic  trigger" and the automatic reversion of failed reorganizations  to liquidation were
eliminated. Finally, trustees were made mandatory  in all reorganization  cases.
In  sum, while there were some design flaws in both the original and the amended
bankruptcy  laws, 5 the adoption of the 1991 law was a step forward in Hungary and provided
a reasonably  efficient  economic  framework  for the reorganization  or exit of problem firms. Was
it implemented? Yes it was, due in large part to the powerful  nudge provided by the automatic
trigger.  Was it implemented  as it would  have been in advanced market economies,  or even as
anticipated  by its designers? No it was not, and to understand  why one must turn to institutions
and incentives.
The Institutional  Base: Hungary's Legal and Commercial  Institutions
5  For details, see Gray,  Schlorke, and Szanyi (1995).  For a somewhat different view, see Bonin and Schaffer
(1994).
11When the bankruptcy  law was adopted in Hungary, the institutions  needed to implement
it were extremely weak.  First, there were very few bankruptcy  judges -- only 8 in the entire
Budapest court 6 in  mid-1992 (handling about 4000 cases) -- and even fewer with a  clear
understanding  of the issues involved. Second,  the professions  that we tend to take for granted
in advanced  market economies  and that are so critical in bankruptcy  proceedings  -- accountants,
lawyers, appraisers,  trustees -- were in  their infancy.  Third,  banks and other creditors
(including  trade and government  creditors) lacked employees  trained in market-based  financial
analysis and workout negotiation  techniques.  Fourth, the economy lacked the institutions --
whether trained and motivated  bank supervisors,  wary depositors,  or interested owners -- that
markets depend  on to oversee  bank management  and counteract  fraud and inefficiency. Finally,
financial and  cost  accounting systems were poorly  developed within debtor enterprises
themselves.
All of this institutional  weakness  added up to a huge asymmetry  in access to information
concerming  debtor enterprises (such as their true profit-earning  potential  or the true extent and
value of their assets). Creditors  suffered  from a vacuum  of information  (with  little place to turn
to reliably  generate  it), while  only senior  managers  within the debtor firms  had full access to this
important information.  This  contrasts markedly with  the  situation in  advanced market
economies, where both judicial and "watchdog" institutions insure much broader access to
relevant information  in bankruptcy  cases  among both debtors and their various creditors. What
happens when information is asymmetrically  distributed?  Those with access have greater
6  Mizsei  (1993).
12opportunity  to use the information  for their own ends, as discussed  further below.
Demand for Law?: The Incentives  Surrounding  the Bankruptcy  Process
Even with  a  well-designed law  and  sufficient information, would the  Hungarian
bankruptcy  law have  been implemented  as intended  by policy  makers  and as a similar  law would
be in advanced market economies? This depends  in large part on the incentives  of the various
parties, which depend in turn on the extent of their independence  from the state and thus their
dependence  on the market  for survival. The major  parties whose  incentives  matter in bankruptcy
reorganizations  are the debtors and their creditors.  Added to this in liquidation  cases are the
liquidators  themselves.
Debtors.  Beginning  with debtors, one can differentiate  between owners and managers
of debtor firms, whether public  or private. To the extent that an owner  owns 100  percent of the
firm and is also the manager,  the incentives  of owners and managers  are one and the same.  If
the owner-manager's  ownership  interest is less than 100  percent, or if the owner  is not also the
manager, the incentives  of these two parties are likely to differ.  Hungarian managers, like
managers  everywhere, are likely to obtain satisfaction  from two sources -- the performance  of
their firms and their own personal  economic  remuneration. The mix between these objectives
varies from manager  to manager  and firm to firm, but in most cases each plays some role.  As
is well-known  in  Western literature, agency costs (including  managers' pursuit of personal
agendas, even at the expense of shareholder  value) are likely to be higher when shareholder
monitoring  is weak. For example, a manager  of a state-owned  firm may  have a strong  incentive
13to  'spontaneously privatize"  the  firm's  assets, 7 particularly if  those assets  are  readily
transferable  and if such transfer  is unlikely  to harm his or her reputation  because the owner (i.e.
the state) is either disinterested  or uninformed. The manager of a private firm may face the
same  incentives  to the extent  there are many widely-dispersed  owners  without  adequate  incentive
to monitor management. Similarly,  a partial owner who manages  a private firm may have an
incentive to transfer assets of the enterprise to another firm more fully owned by that person.
In any case, one common  incentive  of managers  in many transition settings is to increase their
ownership of valuable assets while decreasing their ownership of  costly liabilities -- or to
"privatize' assets and "socialize"  liabilities.
In the Hungarian case, privatization  has moved quite slowly, due in large part to the
country's dedication  to the sales approach  and its eschewing  of any form of mass privatization.
Yet, unlike  in Poland or the former Yugoslavia,  Hungary's state-owned  enterprises do not have
a long tradition of worker activism and control.  This, combined with the practical difficulties
faced by Hungary's state asset management  agencies in their attempts to monitor the activities
within hundreds of individual firms, has essentially  left managers in almost total control of
state-owned  firms, with little oversight  by owners or workers.
Creditors.  At the same time that some managers  face strong  incentives  to divert assets
of firms, many creditors  in transition  economies  lack strong  incentives  to stop them. In Hungary
the principal  creditors  are government  agencies,  trade creditors,  and banks,  each holding  roughly
7  Assets'  here should be read broadly to include valuable intangibles such as customer lists, service contracts,
or the working time of productive employees.
14equal proportions of the debt of the large problem enterprises.'  The government creditors
include the tax office, the social security  service, and the customs  office. These authorities  were
not known  for active law enforcement  and collection  of arrears; in contrast, their legacy carried
over from socialism was one of pervasive bargaining and redistribution from profitable and
loss-making  firms. 9 Habits and attitudes do not die easily.  Although there is some evidence
that budget pressures have made government  creditors more vigilant, tax and social security
arrears clearly continue to be a major source of financing  for firms in financial  distress. 10
The incentives  of trade creditors depend in large part on their links with the state, and
these are changing quite rapidly with the growth of the private sector in Hungary.  As with
government debt, a  significant portion of  the debt to  trade creditors consists of  overdue
receivables, many which arose in  1991 and 1992 when the enterprise sector in both countries
was subject to  serious demand and liquidity shocks.  These shocks led  to  a  network of
inter-enterprise  credits that itself undercut  discipline  due to the fear of "domino" bankruptcies
if any one party attempted  to collect  debts. There is evidence, however, that trade creditors are
slowly becoming more active in preventing the emergence of new overdue receivables by
requiring  payment in advance  before goods are shipped  to problem firms.
The third major category of creditor is banks.  Credit from banks represents less than
half the total liabilities  of troubled firms in Hungary.  Nonetheless,  banks play an important  if
Baer and Gray  (1996).
9  Kornai and Matits (1984), Vodopivec  (1994), Schaffer  (1990).
'0 Bonin and Schaffer (1994).
15not pivotal role among creditors in maintaining  borrower discipline and forcing workouts or
liquidations  in problem firms.  Banks are the only source of financing available now to most
Hungarian  firms,  apart  from  self-financing and  temporary involuntary  financing from
government,  trading partners, and employees  through  arrears.  In advanced market economies
banks are clearly key players in bankruptcy  processes.
Yet the incentives  of large state-owned  Hungarian  banks in the early 1990s have been
complex  and confused. As in most transition  economies,  many of the state-owned  commercial
banks in  Hungary were insolvent by  1992 when evaluated using internationally accepted
accounting  principles.  These insolvencies  resulted from severl  causes, including bad loans
inherited from the socialist "nionobankl, transition-induced  defaults on existing loans, and
defaults on new credits extended after the onset of rlative price reform."  As in many other
countries, Hungary moved to  reinvigorate existing banks via recapitalization.  A one-time
recapitalization  may be needed early in the transition to establish  viable institutions, given the
undercapitalized  state of most commercial  banks when initally separated from the monobank.
However, growing experience  from around the world  is showing that recapitalization  is itself
a risky undertaking,  particularly  if undertaken  repeatedly. If it leads bank managers  to believe
that future losses will also be offset by the government, it can  encourage fraud and moral
hazard and  further undercut the incentives of  banks to  expend time and energy pursuing
delinquent  borrowers.  1 2 Hungarian banks were effectively  recapitalized four times between
"  Indeed, while some of the problem  ws  inherited from  the brakup of socialism, much of it arose from
lending  made  during the 1990-1991  period.  Abed  (1994) provid.  wpportive  da  for BudApest  Bank.
12 For further discussion,  see Baer and Gry  (1996).
161991 and 1994, with a total value of some $3.4 billion  - equivalent  to about 9% of 1993 GDP.
Yet little else was done to create strong market-based  incentives  within  banks. The government
did  not  carry  out  independent, in-depth portfolio  or  operations reviews  before  the
recapitalizations  or implement  performance-oriented  management  contracts. Managers did not
have strong  and clear incentives  to undertake  actions that would increase the value of the banks
they managed. The government failed to formulate a clear plan for state-bank privatization,
although two banks (the foreign trade  bank and Budapest  Bank) have recently attempted to
privatize (the first successfully,  the second not yet so) largely on their own initiative. Most
observers  agree that banking  supervision  has been weak.  In sum, banks have continued  to rely
on  government support, and this has arguably undercut their  aggressive pursuit of  debt
collection.
The Outcome: Rule of Law?
To what extent  is Hungay's  bankruptcy  experience  evidence  of the development  of "rule
of law"?  In other words, to  what extent did the introduction of a new bankruptcy law in
Hungary change the behavior of those ostensibly  subject to it, and in ways envisioned in the
law?  The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the automatic trigger unequivocally  resulted
in an enormous wave of filings, as managers  evidently  took seriously the civil penalties they
could personally incur if they hiled to file.  Furthermore, evidence gathered from a recent
survey of 117  bankruptcy  cases  filed in 1992 and 1993'3  indicates  that the rough outlines of the
See Gray, Schlorke,  and  Snnyi (1995).
17mandated  legal procedures were more or less followed. Debtors filing for reorganization  did
benefit (until September  1993) from automatic stays on debt service and collateral  foreclosure,
and they did generally  put forward reorganization  plans within the 3-4 month period provided
in  the law.  The cases of  firms whose plans were not approved reverted automatically  to
liquidation. In liquidation cases there is clear evidence that appointed liquidators  maintained
strong control over the liquidation  process and made at least partial attempts to fulfill their legal
duties and requirements.
More important  than  adherence  to process, however,  is the fact that bankruptcy  outcomes
appear broadly to follow some  degree  of economic  logic. Of the 117  firms surveyed, those that
successfully  emerged  from reorganization  were on average  less heavily indebted  and had better
profit performance  (i.e. smaller losses) than either those that filed in reorganization  (and thus
reverted to liquidation)  or those that avoided reorganization  altogether and filed directly for
liquidation. The achievement  of a roughly  logical  economic  outcome  can arguably  be considered
a real success, given the newness  of the process and the underdeveloped  state of the institutions
involved.
On the other hand, the actual outcomes  of the bankruptcy  process still appear to differ
substantially  from what was envisioned  in the law.  The differences  arise in large part from the
underdevelopment of  norms  of  fiduciary responsibility, the  tremendous asymmetry of
information  access, and the weak  incentives  of some  creditors to oversee the process and assure
the maximum possible return on their outstanding  credits.  First,  there is ample anecdotal
evidence (not easily verifiable through surveys) that many managers take advantage of the
18bankruptcy  process as a means to privatize assets and socialize  liabilities. In some cases they
transfer valuable  assets to separate  private firms prior to filing, leaving the less valuable assets
and the liabilities to enter the bankruptcy  process. Creditors may also be involved in asset
diversion, by colluding with the debtor firm to transfer assets and thus repay that particular
creditor  prior to bankruptcy  at the expense  of other creditors." 4 In advanced market  economies,
such transfers  in anticipation  of bankruptcy  are void or voidable  by the trustee. They are by law
also voidable in Hungary, but liquidators report tremendous difficulty obtaining necessary
evidence, due  in  large  part  to  the  underdevelopment of  the  "watchdog" institutions." 5
Furthermore, in advanced market economies well-developed  laws and traditions of fiduciary
responsibility  inhibit such behavior, but these laws and traditions  are not yet well-developed  in
transition environments  such as Hungary's.
Second, liquidators  and the managers of debtor firms may in many cases be following
the letter but not necessarily  the spirit of the law.  It appears that liquidation  is to a large extent
perceived  by all parties more as reorganization  than as pure liquidation. This has become  even
more true since late-1993, when the number of reorganization  cases began a steep decline' 6 --
'4  The incentive for such creditor collusion is partly attributable to the weak legal protection given to collateral
and  the resulting  difficulties that secured creditors face in collecting debts  through  formal and  transparent  legal
mueans.
's  To avoid detection,  managers or creditors could either wait one year  to file in order  to avoid the period
during which liquidators could retroactively void transfers, or they could destroy the records  so that the transfers
were not later traceable by creditors,  trustees, or liquidators.
16  Several factors have contributed to this decline, including (a) a natural decline after the initial glut of cases;
(b) the elimination in September 1993 of the automatic trigger; (c) the elimination at the same time of the automatic
3-month moratorium on debt service (which motivated many filings); (d) the substitution of a separate process --
'debtor  consolidation'  -- for bankruptcy in many cases; and (e) the requirement, added in September 1993, that a
trustee must be appointed in all bankruptcy cases.
19i.e.  when liquidation appears in  effect  to  have replaced reorganization as  the  primary
restructuring process.  Interviews with liquidators and firms suggest that many if not most
liquidators see themselves as active restructurers, representing first of  all  the interests of
employees or the public rather than the interests of creditors.  Virtually all "real" firms (as
opposed to "shells" or firms with minimal  assets, of which there are plenty) stay alive during
the liquidation process as the liquidator  looks for ways to privatize their viable parts." 7 This
approach is encouraged  by a design feature added to the law itself in 1993: the provision that
liquidators  earn 2 percent of gross proceeds of firms in liquidation  as long as the firms are still
in operation.' 8 While this outcome may be good for restructuring  and privatization, it is not
necessarily good for creditors, who may lack either sufficient information and institutional
enforcement  power or sufficient  motivation to challenge  liquidators' actions.  In the end, of
course, this lack of a viable creditor-led  "exit" and debt collection mechanism  can be costly to
firms, because it increases the cost and reduces the flow of credit in the economy.
In sum, Hungary's experience  with bankruptcy  reform indicates  the difficulty  of pushing
economic  and legal change "from above", given the lack of well-established  norms of fiduciary
responsibility,  institutional  weakness  (leading  to serious  information  bottlenecks),  and continued
soft budget constraints on the part of certain creditors.  However, it also illustrates some
progress can  be  made in  a  relatively short time period if  a  country undertakes strong
forward-looking policy initiatives.  Not only  has the concept of  bankruptcy gained some
7  Gray, Schlorke, and Szanyi (1995).
'  If the assets are sold, the liquidator earns 5 percent of sales proceeds,  which in many cases is substantially
less than 2 percent  of ongoing revenues.
20legitimacy it  lacks in  so many other transitional economies, but Hungary's initiative has
contributed  toward building  the institutions  needed for rule of law to take hold. The process has
stimulated the development of a cadre of professional trustees and liquidators with in-depth
knowledge  of techniques  of financial  and organizational  restructuring. Hungary  has been willing
to license both foreign and domestic firms as liquidators, and the foreign participation has
brought outside knowledge  and expertise  into the picture.  It has also led to an increase in the
number  and commercial  expertise  of judges and in the sophistication  of the banks' understanding
and approach to debt collection. Finally, for better or worse, it has probably been one of the
main stimulants  of privatization  (both  of assets and of parts of going concerns)  in the Hungarian
economy since 1992, and thus has furthered the separation  of the economy from state control
that is so essential  to the healthy development  of rule by law.  In its reforms of bankruptcy  law,
Hungary  appears to be moving  generally  in the right direction, albeit  certainly  not without  some
difficulty  along the way.
Russia's Experience  with Company  Law
Russia presents a somewhat different case from Hungary.  Its experience with state
socialism  was twice as long and infinitely  more intense.  Consequently,  the behavioral  patterns
that grew out of socialist  incentives  and institutional  structures  were more deeply entrenched  and
arguably more resistent to change.
One of the key elements  of Russian  economic  reform (as in Hungary  and other transition
21economies)  was the legalization  of private property and the subsequent  privatization  of the state
industrial sector.  Although the state retained an interest in most enterprises, the privatization
process brought about a profound change  in the ownership structure, as state enterprises were
transformed  into private entities.  But privatization  was only a means to an end.  The goal was
to increase  the efficiency  of Russian firms and, ultimately,  to make them capable of competing
in the global marketplace. Privatizing  a firm is necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve that
goal.  More important is effecting a change in how the business is run.  Such change comes
about slowly. The state cannot unilaterally  compel change in enterprise behavior. At best, the
state can reshape the environment  within which the enterprise operates, and thereby have some
influence  at the margins.
The Legal Framework: Russian Company  Law
The technical problems of Russian law (including  company law) are legion.  Merely
finding  the law can be a struggle  -- to say nothing  of the difficulty  of interpretation. Laws are
often internally  contradictory  or make cross-references  to laws that either do not yet exist or do
not say what the first law claims.  The desire to make the market reforms irreversible has led
to impatience with the long debates within the legislature, and to a preference for executive
decrees. Ruling by decree is easier in the short run, but does little to move society  towards the
rule of law.  Decrees are inherently  non-democratic;  they are conceptualized  and introduced  in
a top-down  fashion  that often ignores local legal culture. None of these shortcomings  are unique
to Russia, but they are particularly  troubling  in the Russian  context because they tend to deepen
22the general distrust of the legal system that lingers on from the Soviet period.
The changes in company law over the past decade have generally tracked  macro-level
economic reforms,  though they have often lagged a step or two behind.  They began with the
1988  Law  on  State  Enterprises," 9 which  represented  the  first  tentative  move  away  from
administrative controls towards greater enterprise autonomy.  The years that followed brought
new laws on property  and business organizations that reflected an  increased  (and sometimes
grudging) willingness to accept private property and passive investment interests.  By 1990, both
Soviet 20 and Russian 21 legislation recognized privately owned business organizations of various
types.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet laws became null and void to the extent
that they contradicted existing Russian law.22
While  not  yet contemplating  full privatization,  these  early  laws  opened  the door  to
experimentation with new forms of corporate organization.  Some adventuresome managers, for
example, took advantage of these opportunities to engage in "spontaneous privatization"  on the
'9  Vedomosti  SSSR, No. 26, Item 385, 1987. The law was passed in  July 1987  and went into effect  in January
1988.
'  E.g.,  "On cooperatives  in the USSR," Vedomosti  SSSR, No. 22, Item 355, 1988; Fundamentals  of
Legislation  of the USSR on the Lease, Vedomosti  SND SSSR, No. 25, Item 481,  1989; "On property in the
USSR," Vedomosti  SND SSSR, No. 11, Item 164, 1990;  Law on enterprises  in the USSR, Vedomosti  SND  SSSR,
No. 25, Item 460, 1990; Statute  on joint-stock  companies  and limited  liability lcmpanies, Sobranie  Postanovienii
Pravitel'stva  SSSR, No. 15, Item 82, 1990.
21  E.g., "On enterprises  and entrepreneurial  activity in the RSFSR," Vedomosti  RSFSR, No. 30, Item 418,
1990 (amended  on June 24, 1992); "On property in the RSFSR," Vedomosti  RSFSR, No. 30, Item 417, 1990;
Decree on joint-stock  companies,  Order No. 601, 25 December  1990  (amended  on April 15, 1992, Order No. 255,
and on November  24, 1993, Order No. 2004).
2  This  sort of open-ended  rule on the continuing  validity  of Soviet  law was unfortunate,  but unavoidable. The
Russian  government  (whether  the executive  or legislative  branch)  could not possibly  create an entire  legal framework
overnight.
23enterprise and sub-enterprise  level. 23 Yet these laws were superficial  and provided little if any
guidance  on organizational  structure, fiduciary  duty or shareholders' rights.  For example, the
Soviet  laws purported  to create "collective  enterprises,"  but the legislative  language  was unclear
and incomplete. 4 Basic questions, such as whether equity interests were alienable, whether
equity owners could be called on for capital contributions, or the extent to which they could
participate  in management,  were left unanswered.
During the last few years of the Soviet Union, the Russian legislature (led by Yeltsin)
had  consistently been  more  committed to  market  reforms  than its  Soviet counterpart.
Consequently,  Russian company law represented  a significant  improvement  over Soviet law. 25
In particular, the Decree on Joint-Stock  Companies  (1990)  set forth guidelines  on the rights and
duties of  shareholders and directors.  But even this law fell short of creating a  complete
framework. In particular, it was silent on remedies and fiduciary duty.  Shareholders  had no
legal mechanism  for enforcing  their rights, and had only minimal  rights to information  about the
operation of the company.
'3  Johnson and Kroll (1991), Burawoy  and Hendley (1992).
4 This example is relevant to our case study.  Article 2 of the USSR Enterprise Law recognized  collective
enterprises  as a legitimate  form of business  organization. The subsequent  articles  failed to articulate  the rights and
obligations  of holders of property interests  in collective  enterprises. Law on enterprises  in the USSR, Vedomosti
SND SSSR, No. 25, Item 460, 1990. See also Article 12, "On property in the USSR," Vedomosti  SND SSSR,
No. 11, Item 164, 1990.
2  This first wave of market-oriented  business legislation  was largely home-grown. This is not to say that
Russian  reformers  were not influenced  by foreign  models. Certainly  they  were.  But the influx of foreign advisors
did not begin in earnest until 1992, when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization  of retail prices
signaled  the beginning  of serious market  reforms. See generally,  Rutland  (1994) and Boyko, Shleifer  and Vishny
(1993).
24Incremental  changes  were  made  in  company  law  during  the  next  few  years, 2"  but
attention  was largely  focused  on privatization.  The periodic  omnibus  privatization  decrees
addressed certain aspects of company law, but not in a comprehensive manner.  For example,
one decree  included a  "standard" charter  that implicitly addressed certain aspects of fiduciary
duty,  and  several other  decrees designed  to protect  shareholders'  rights  were  issued  on the
specific topic of registries."  More recently, in the 1993 version of the privatization program,
the state imposed a requirement  of cumulative voting and mandated that joint-stock companies
with  more  than ten  thousand  shareholders  should  have  no  less  than  nine  members  on  the
board. 28 Embedding the rules on corporate governance in privatization decrees undermined the
effort to create transparent and universalistic legal standards.  Typically, these decrees were very
lengthy, and it could be difficult to find the relevant provisions.  Moreover,  privatization decrees
applied only to enterprises that privatized through traditional routes, not to the many enterprises
who fashioned their own route. 29 In principle,  how an enterprise  privatizes should not affect
the law that governs it subsequently as a privatized entity.  A more comprehensive approach
26  For example,  the Russian  decree  on joint stock  companies  was amended  on April 15, 1992  (Order No. 255),
and on November  24, 1993  (Order No. 2004). The Russian  enterprise law was amended  on June 24, 1992.
27  E.g., "On the Protection  of Investors' Interest,  " No. 1233,  11  June 1994  (as amended  on 4 November  1994),
Sobranie  zakonodatel'stva  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  no. 8; Statute  on Joint-Stock  Company  Shareholders'  Register,  No.
840-r, 18 April 1994, "Rynok  tsennykh  bumag," Financy, part 4,  1994; "On Measures to Ensure the Rights  of
Shareholders,"  No. 1769,  27 October 1993,  Rossiiskie  vesti, 2 November 1993; "On the Privatization  of State  and
Municipal  Enterprises  in the Russian  Federation,' No. 701-r, 4 November  1992,  Ekonomika  i zhizn', no. 47, 1992.
'  "On the state program for privatization  of state and municipal  enterprises  in the Russian Federation,"  No.
2284, 24 December 1993, Sobranie  aktov prezidenta  i pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  no. 1, 1994.
9 As Pistor (1995)  notes, a fair number  of enterprises  obtained  exemptions  from the normal  privatization  rules.
25came only with the new Civil Code, the first part of which was adopted in October 1994.30
Indeed, simultaneously  with its passage  came the nullification  of many laws that had previously
governed corporate affairs. 3"
In  sum,  in  contrast to  Hungary's one-shot introduction of  a  new,  coherent, and
universally  applicable  framework  for bankruptcy,  the potential  impact of company law reform
in Russia has been dissipated  by its piecemeal  nature, its incomplete  coverage, and its failure
to adequately  address many fundamental  issues.
The Institutional  Base: Russian Legal and Commercial  Institutions
While they were weak in Hungary, the institutions  needed to support  a market economy
were extremely  feeble  if not entirely  nonexistent  in Russia  in the 1990-94  period. Consider  first
the courts. In Russia, economic  disputes  are generally  resolved  by the arbitrazh courts. During
the Soviet period, these tribunals dealt with disputes between state enterprises.  This was not
high-profile  work and did not attract the most talented or competent  jurists.  These and other
judicial bodies emerged from the Soviet period with a besmirched  reputation  and a consequent
lack of legitimacy.  Recent years have witnessed major institutional reforms, including an
expansion  of the jurisdiction of the tribunals  and their reconstitution  as "courts," thereby raising
30  Rossiiskaia 2azeta,  No.  238-239,  8 December  1994.  But the  Civil  Code  fails to resolve  the  disparity
regarding the non-universal applicability of some company laws.  Article 96-3 of the Civil Code provides  that 'the
specifics of the legal status of joint-stock companies founded through privatization ...  shall be determined by the
laws and other legal enactments on privatization ..."
3'  For example,  the Civil Code invalidated the 1990 Russian Property  Law and the 1990 Law on Enterprises
and Entrepreneurial  Activity.
26the status of the decision-makers. While these reforms represent a step in the right direction,
they are only the beginning. Questions  persist about the remedies  available  (legal  vs. equitable),
about the power of the arbitrazh judges to enforce their decisions, and about the standing of
individuals to petition these courts. 32 A deep distrust of formal legal institutions persists,
arguably much deeper than in Central Europe.
Other potentially  supportive  "watchdog"  institutions  in Russia  are in their infancy. Since
the late 1980s, the private business  bar has experienced  a remarkable  regeneration,  but its target
clients are entrepreneurs,  not disgruntled  shareholders. Procedural rules stymie  any possibility
that lawyers would take on shareholder-generated  claims  against management. Such claims are
costly and tedious as a result of the inability to aggregate them into class action lawsuits, and
the unavailability of  contingent fees gives private lawyers little incentive to  pursue such
claims."
Institutional  support is also needed  to give meaning  to financial  disclosure  requirements.
Although Russian law requires that open joint-stock companies publish an annual report, a
balance sheet and an income statement,34  this requirement is difficult to enforce in practice.
Many companies  have responded  by deeming  such information  "commercial  secrets," and their
flouting of the law has had few repercussions. State regulation  of securities  is in its infancy  in
3  See Hendley  (1995)  and  Pistor  (1995). On  April  5, 1995,  the  State  Duma  adopted  a new law 'On Arbitrazh
Courts  in the  Russian  Federation'  and  a new Arbitrazh  Procedure  Code  of the  Russian  Federation.  Article  22 of
the latter  clarifies  that  citizens  have the  right  to appeal  to arbitrazh  courts  for relief under  certain  circumstances.
Article  6 of the former  law  states  that  decisions  of arbitrazh  courts  are binding,  but does not directly  address  the
question  of enforcement.
33  See Easterbrook  and  Fischel  (1991), 100-102.
3  Article 97-1, Civil Code.
27Russia and thus is still largely ineffective.  Even if the information  is published, the lack of
uniform accounting  standards can render it virtually meaningless. An independent  accounting
profession that is capable of valuing assets and auditing  ongoing  operations  is only beginning  to
form in Russia.  As a result, financial  statements  are often prepared in-house, and put the best
possible face on the situation.
Finally, an additional "watchdog" institution in  the area of company law might be
shareholder  advocacy  groups which, in recent years, have begun to form around the country.
Yet their efforts tend to  focus on  legislative lobbying, rather than on  the protection of
shareholders' interests at individual enterprises.  Moreover, the absence of any class action
mechanism within the  civil  procedure code renders the  collective action hurdle almost
insurmountable  and makes it unlikely  that advocacy  groups will take up violations of fiduciary
duty. 35
Demand for Law?: Incentives  Within the Firm
How do the laws and institutions,  inadequate  as they may be, translate into behavior  in
the firm?  And to what extent is there a demand for better laws and institutions? The answer
to these questions depends in large part on the incentives  of the parties -- in particular the
managers  and shareholders,  whether insiders  or outsiders to the firm.
3  In some of the more notorious pyramid schemes (e.g.,  MMM), defrauded shareholders have attempted to
persuade the legislature to reimburse them for their losses and to crimninalize  the activities of the fund's organizers.
Whether such collective actions represent movement towards the rule of law or merely a reversion  to old habits of
relying on the state for a bail-out is questionable.
28Russian  managers,  like managers  in Hungary  and elsewhere, obtain  satisfaction  from both
the performance of their firms and their own personal economic remuneration.  During the
Soviet period, law was largely irrelevant for state enterprise managers  in the pursuit of either
objective.  Personal relationships,  rather than rules of general application, were the glue that
held economic  transactions  together. Law was to be avoided; many managers  regarded  it as an
oppressive  instrument  of the state. 36 The idea that law could be used affirmatively  as a means
to create an optimal  form of business  organization  still strikes most Russian  managers  as absurd.
In theory, the combination  of market-based  economic  reform and political  fragmentation
could generate a "demand" for law on the part of managers.  No longer is any single group
(e.g., the Communist  Party) capable of dictating  the rules of the game.  Instead, a plethora  of
groups  have emerged  that need to find some  way to co-exist. At the same  time, private property
has been legalized, giving rise to a nascent middle class eager to preserve its gains. 37 Under
such conditions,  law has the potential  to emerge as a compromise  solution for all concerned.
However, the peculiar nature of the Russian  privatization,  which left many firms in the
hands of insiders, may have reduced managers' "demand"  for law.  Private connections  remain
critical in obtaining supplies and making sales, thereby to some extent obviating the need for
universalistic  rules.  Similarly,  as long as a firm can be internally  financed, or can be financed
through continued state subsidies  (whether directly  or through the banking system), neither the
3'  The attitude about formal legal institutions, such as  courts and registration offices,  was analogous,  though
their  distrust was tinged with  an assumption that the people staffing these institutions  were  incompetent and/or
corrupt.
3  See Weber (1978), vol.  1, ch. X; Unger  (1976).
29firm nor its managers need necessarily  develop a reputation for following  consistent  standards
and norms.  That is not to say, however, that managers  can run roughshod  over shareholders.
Managers of employee-owned  firms may still need to develop a community of trust between
labor and management  to boost productivity  and performance  in the firm, and this may require
some degree of (at least perceived)  fairness and openness  in the running  of the company.
With regard to more "private" goals of managers, at a minimum  they almost certainly
want to maintain  their  jobs and as much control over the firm as possible  (considering  the need
for at least a perception of fairness  as noted above).  In addition, Russian managers, like those
in Hungary, may face a substantial  incentive  to skim profits or transfer assets of companies  to
their personal use.
Who are  the potential overseers that might temper the power of  management and
minimize profit-skimming  and insider dealing in privatized firms?  For firms that must raise
money from equity markets or banks, these outside owners or creditors may be able to exert
some controls if (as discussed earlier for Hungary) they are themselves motivated by profit-
maximizing  concerns.2  For privatized firms with primarily  insider  ownership  and the capacity
for self-financing  (even through decapitalization  if necessary), the task falls to the shareholders
and their representatives, the board of directors.  But most Russian shareholders are also
workers and so have conflicted  loyalties. With no alternative  management  team waiting in the
wings, shareholders  are reluctant  to throw out the existing  managers. On a more personal  level,
an individual  shareholder-worker  has little incentive  to rock the boat, fearing that the trouble-
3  Banking  reform is underway  in Russia, but is far from complete. See Johnson  (1994).
30makers will be the first to be laid off.  Board members  themselves  are likely to be employees
also -- often other officers of the company.  The incestuous nature of an employee-owned
company makes it particularly  difficult for insiders to hold board members accountable.
The Role of Law in the Russian Enterprise: The Rule of Law?
While the picture in Hungary may be mixed, the picture in Russia appears more one-
sided.  To date there is little evidence  of an underlying  respect for law, of a perceived  duty to
abide by law, or of a clearly articulated  demand  for the development  of rule by law.  Illustrating
and supporting such conclusion is difficult in the abstract.  Therefore, we have chosen to
describe in  some detail the experience of one privatized firm during the  1991-94 period.
Although  no two firms are exactly alike, we believe  the attitudes  and actions of this firm are a
typical response to  the  laws,  institutions, and  incentives now prevailing in  the  Russian
environment.
The company  is the Saratov Aviation  Plant (Saratovskii  Aviatsionnyi  Zavod or "SAZ"),
a large industrial enterprise that produces 125-seat  passenger airliners (see Box for a more in-
depth description). SAZ was privatized in January 1991, pursuant to a decree of the USSR
Council of Ministers.  In essence, SAZ purchased the assets of the enterprise on behalf of its
workforce (then numbering in excess of 15,000), and thereby transformed  itself from a state
enterprise  into a collective  enterprise. In early 1993,  the stakeholders  in the collective  enterprise
reconstituted  the entity as a closed joint stock company (aktsionnernoe  obshchestvo  zakrytogo
typa).
31&conomic Challenges Facing SAZ
SAZ shares many characteristics of other Russian enterpnses ,prticulary  its
locus within:  the ttransitional  Russian economy and its consequent struggle for survivaL
Its key output is the Yak-42 civilian airliner.  It also produces: many unrelated items.
(e.g.,  bicycles, teapots, cutlery, baby carriages).  During the Soviet periodd,  SAZ was
:  ipart  of 0  the military-industrial complex, 'but the conversion to civlian  production  has
been less  painful:  than for many: other :defense: plants, since SAZ had  the  ption of
;  expanding: already-existing  lines  of  production,  rather  than havingWtoicompletely
reconfigure.  Now SAZ receives almost no government subsidies. i  SAZ'spna  .
::challenge  lies not in  defense conversion, :but:  in selling  its planes..  ;: The :maker  t  or
planes in the former'Soviet  Union:collapsed as Aeroflot split apart and:the  spin-offs
and new airlines struggle for survival.  SAZ's response has been:  to.seeknew.  .marke
but its ability to copete  ef  cively  is limited by ineprien  and by the t..  tt  te.  ..
-Ya  2  is not0  certifiedin  the -West.  A  Like many: other lage  Russian  tepses,  Z
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SAZ is something of an anomaly, in that it privatized early.  As a result, it did not go
through the "corporatization" process later mandated and administered by the State Property
Committee. 39 But our primary interest is not in privatization per  se, but in how privatized
enterprises  actually  function.  SAZ  is  also  somewhat  peculiar  in  that  it  emerged  from
I  Taken together, the various laws and decrees on privatization  required  that a state enterprise  transform  itself
into a joint-stock company prior  to privatizing.  See Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle, et al (1993).  Pistor (1995)
contends that this corporatization  process was merely a formalistic legal change, and that it did not lead to any
change in organizational  structure.
32privatization  as a one-hundred  percent employee-owned  company. The state retained no equity
interest.  This was not an option available to enterprises that privatized later.40 Once again,
this does not lessen our interest in SAZ as a subject for case study.  As one of the few totally
private enterprises in Russia, it provides an ideal setting in which to study the role of law.
There are two discrete stages in SAZ's post-privatization  development. The first is the
transition  from collective  enterprise  to closed  joint-stock  company,  which took place  during 1992
and culminated  in a shareholders' meeting in February 1993, at which the reorganization  was
formally  approved. The second is the operation of SAZ as a joint-stock  company  during 1993
and 1994. In each stage law played a peripheral  role in shaping  enterprise behavior.
Transition to Joint-Stock Company. Ironically, the catalyst for the transition to joint-
stock company did come from the law.  The collective  enterprise (kollektivnoe  predpriiatie or
"KP") was a form of business organization  recognized  under Soviet law but not under Russian
law.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, SAZ's legal status became rather precarious.
But this technical legal problem was not the real reason for abandoning  the KP form.
The dissatisfaction  went deeper.  It stemmed  from a failure to define the rights and obligations
of the various  participants  at the outset. With the purchase  of SAZ  assets from the state in early
1991, all  SAZ employees automatically became "co-owners" (so-vladel'tsy) and  received
"membership  units" reflecting an equity interest in SAZ. 41  Neither the charter (ustav) nor the
4D  See generally, Rutland (1994).
"  All SAZ employees received units  worth  600  rubles.  Additional units  were  distributed  according  to a
formula based on seniority, salary and qualifications that was set forth in the bylaws.  Notwithstanding the fact that
property interests in SAZ resembled stock, we use the word 'unit'  to describe them because the SAZ organizational
documents purposely  avoid describing them as stock (aktsia), referring to them as lots (dolya).
33bylaws (polozieniia)  of the KP clarified the role of co-owners,  and the law provided  no guidance
(as noted earlier).  No certificates  representing  ownership  of "units" were issued. This created
considerable uncertainty  among co-owners as to whether their ownership interests were real.
Because the co-owners worked at SAZ, and the primary goal of privatization  had been to spur
productivity, top management  felt compelled  to take action.
SAZ management  had consulted with Soviet experts when drafting the organizational
documents  for the KP. Their inexperience  with market-based  business organizations,  combined
with the shortcomings  of the law, contributed  to the creation of an entity that served no one's
interests.  The intermediary  institutions, such as securities regulators, shareholder advocacy
groups and private lawyers, that in principle could have provided assistance were almost non-
existent  in Russia  in 1991-92. When seeking  to remedy the situation,  the general director  looked
outside the Soviet Union for assistance, and invited a  group of  specialists from Stanford
University  to come to Saratov for several weeks in January 1992. The task of this group (of
which one of the authors was a member)  was not to force Western models onto SAZ, but to
introduce new methods by which SAZ management  might achieve its goal of becoming a
cohesive, efficient employee-owned  joint-stock  company.
The decision  to reorganize  as a joint-stock  company  brought SAZ within the ambit  of the
new set of Russian laws, which, as noted earlier, were somewhat  better than the old Soviet
legislation but  still failed to  define fiduciary duties or  provide for adequate disclosure or
remedies. The SAZ managers  had a choice:  whether  to structure  SAZ according  to the statutory
requirements or  to  go  beyond those minimal requirements and  create additional internal
34standards. They chose the latter.  In the short run, the choice is puzzling. After all, the gaps
in the law would  seem to work to their benefit, in that they enhanced management's  capacity  to
maintain  control of the company. Over the long run, however,  any such manipulative  behavior
would undermine the goal of creating a community  of trust between labor and management,
which the SAZ managers believed essential for employee  ownership to work. 42 In this way
privatization  did create some demand for objective  limits  on managerial  discretion.
SAZ did not embrace all of the Americans'  recommendations.  It incorporated  those  that
seemed to fit the local context.  For example, the charter limits the amount of stock that any
single person (or entity) can own. 43 Along similar lines, the bylaws governing the board of
directors make an effort to forbid conflicts of interest.'  These bylaws also hold directors
accountable  for  losses  to  SAZ  resulting  from  the  "dishonest" or  "unconscientious'
(nedobrosovestnoe)  fulfillment  of their duties, and imply that such a cause of action can be
pursued in the courts. 45
The organizational  documents  evidence  a strong commitment  to the one share-one  vote
4  For an analysis of why SAZ managers acted in their long-term interests, see Hendley (1992).
4  The chairman of the board of directors can not own more than 0.2  percent of the total outstanding shares.
Other members of the board are limited to 0.15 percent, and ordinary shareholders are limited to 0.1 percent.
U  The bylaws provide that:  'Members of the board of directors do not have the right indirectly or directly to
receive [outside] compensation for exerting influence on the decision-making process of the board of directors.'
4  The mechanism by which such a cause of action might be pursued was not specified in the bylaws, nor was
it to be found in statutory law.  In all likelihood, it was a symbolic right.  No SAZ director was ever prosecuted
under this provision.  A recommendation to include a more straightforward right of shareholders to sue directors
was rejected out of hand.  Management contended that the courts'  lack of familiarity with such cases would cause
them to be dismissed.  Proposals to get around this problem by making such shareholder claims subject to private
arbitration were likewise rejected, suggesting that management was not eager to encourage shareholders to mobilize
their rights.
35principle. SAZ created  its own system  of proxy voting; it abandoned  the old system  of selecting
delegates to the conference, which smacked of the Party system and facilitated managerial
manipulation  of the results.'  Moreover, management  took steps (not required by law) to
ensure that worker-shareholders  understood  the reorganization  process.  Virtually every 1992
issue of the weekly factory newspaper  contained  articles about some aspect of the joint-stock
company.  Drafts of the organizational  documents were published in this newspaper, giving
workers an opportunity to comment.  Top management  held open meetings and answered
questions.  The stated purpose was to open up the process to all shareholders.
Neither law nor supporting  institutions  was critical in changing SAZ's behavior in this
first stage of its development  as a privatized  company. The institutions  were non-existent,  and
the written law was patently inadequate.  Moreover, management  was highly skeptical about
the relevance  of law to its situation. But the willingness  to impose  additional  duties on directors
reflected a desire  -- albeit inchoate -- for  rules  of the game that would  work over  the long
run.  Thus, SAZ management's  decision  to reorganize  as a joint-stock  company  and to impose
minimal fiduciary duties on directors was to some extent the result of privatization  and the
beginnings  of market-based  incentives. The goal was a profitable  company  that was capable  of
competing  with Western aviation firms.  The SAZ managers  believed that productivity  would
increase only if workers participated  in the changes -- that this would generate a sense of trust
and community.  The beginnings of a  demand for fair  and objective norms -- if  not yet
overarching law -- are noticeable.
4  Cf., Pistor (1995).
36Operation as a Joint-Stock Company. Thus far, we have only a static vision of SAZ
based on its organizational  documents. More important  in terms of assessing  the prospects for
the  rule of  law is  what happened after  the registration of  the joint-stock company. Did
management  abide by its self-imposed  rules? Did it pay any attention  to subsequent  changes  in
the statutory  law?
At the beginning  the reorganization  created  a sense of enthusiasm  within the plant.  The
first election of the board  of directors  was taken  quite seriously,  and the candidates  outnumbered
the available seats. 47 They represented a wide variety of interests within the plant, and were
not exclusively  the hand-picked  disciples  of the general director.  Similarly,  the board that was
finally elected, while made up of top managers, included individuals  who had been known to
disagree with the general director.
However, any hope that the board of directors  would  be a genuine  decision-making  body
died a quick death.  From the start, board meetings  were elaborately choreographed;  no real
debate  was permitted. The general director  exercised  dictatorial  power.  This is, of course, not
unique  to Russian companies, but it is particularly  troubling in the Russian context because it
creates an impression  of "business  as usual" -- of a continuation  of hierarchical  Soviet-style  of
"one-man management."48  Given the absence of outside directors, the unwillingness  of the
board members  to challenge  the general director in a quasi-public  forum made board approval
of any decision virtually automatic.  Not surprisingly, this deflated the post-reorganization
4  A two-part  election  was necessary  to winnow  down the field.
See generally,  Berliner  (1957) and Granick (1960).
37enthusiasm  and caused many to believe that the transition  from state enterprise to KP to joint-
stock company  had been only a change in form, not in substance. By 1993, elections for the
board had become  routinized,  with the number  of candidates  equalling  the number of open spots.
When questioned,  those who ran unsuccessfully  in 1992 said they had no interest in being on
a board that merely rubber-stamped  the decisions  of the general director.
While this provides some sense of the atmosphere that prevailed at SAZ, the more
important  question  is whether  the legal obligations  imposed  by the charter and bylaws have  been
enforced. The record is mixed. The restrictions  on the amount of stock that can be owned  by
any shareholder  have been enforced.  Obviously,  this is critical in an employee-owned  firm,
since a concentration  of ownership  (particularly  within management)  would undercut  the rights
of worker-shareholders.  SAZ has continued  to operate as a relatively  open company. A detailed
financial  report is published  in the factory  newspaper  before each annual shareholders' meeting,
and a tremendous  amount  of supplemental  information  can be found in the newspaper  throughout
the year.  A booklet containing  the charter, bylaws  and form documents  for buying and selling
SAZ stock and for voting by proxy has been printed and distributed  to interested shareholders.
Though shares may be voted by proxy, annual meetings  continue  to be open to all.  There has
been no reversion to the Soviet system of electing  delegates, who then vote the shares of their
work collectives.
On the other hand, the self-imposed  rules on fiduciary  duty lie dormant. Allegations  of
profit-skimming  and insider  dealing on the part of board members  are rampant within the plant,
but have resulted in no formal charges.  Along similar lines, the general director is subject to
38no meaningful  oversight. He often makes  significant  contractual  commitments  on behalf of SAZ
without  prior board approval  (or even knowledge). He has also brought SAZ into major joint
ventures with Russian  and foreign entities  without  seeking  shareholder  approval. This is not to
say that these transactions  are not in the interest of SAZ. Perhaps they  are, but they still legally
require vetting by the board and/or the shareholders. Certainly  the general director  speaks  with
great passion about his commitment  to SAZ and to the workers.  The point is that he feels no
obligation  to comply with legal niceties.
A second  related question  is whether SAZ has complied  with company  laws and decrees
passed since its 1992 reorganization  as a joint-stock company.  In certain cases, such as the
decrees regarding registries and cumulative  voting and minimum  board size, SAZ had to take
no action, because the law paralleled the already-existing  internal rules at SAZ.  In contrast, it
has flagrantly defied the  state policy against large closed joint-stock companies.  It  has
consistently refused to  allow outsiders to  take an  active role in  the  management of  the
company, 49 relying to some extent on loopholes. 50 Eventually, the these loop-holes will be
closed. SAZ knows  this well, but stubbornly  refuses to change. The noose has begun to tighten
4  SAZ has permitted several outsiders to purchase stock.  All such sales were approved  by the shareholders
(as required under the charter), and each of purchasers has a sustained relationship with SAZ.  None of these people
has been put on the board of directors.
5  This policy is reflected in the provision of the 1993 privatization program that limits the number of directors
who may be  employees of an  open joint-stock  company to  one-third of  the board.  Technically,  these rules  are
inapplicable to SAZ on two grounds.  First,  SAZ is a closed joint-stock company.  Second, it was not a 'state'  or
'municipal'  enterprise  at  the time this decree  (or any  other decree or  law on  privatization) was issued, and  so
arguably does not fall within its jurisdiction.
39with the adoption  of the new Civil Code, though a bit of breathing room remains. 5"
Why can SAZ and its managers  and directors disobey both company  laws and decrees
generally  and the company's own charter and bylaws? They can because no one individual  or
institution attempts to  force compliance.  For  example, although insider dealing is clearly
prohibited by the organizational  documents, no one has pursued the persistent allegations of
insider dealing in SAZ.  One reason is institutional  weakness  -- namely the dearth of qualified
lawyers, the high cost of proving wrong due to weak "watchdog" institutions, and the deep-
seated mistrust of  formal enforcement institutions such as  the courts.  Yet even if  weak
institutions  prohibit outside enforcement, why are potential violations of the duties owed by
board members to SAZ not raised in internal forums, such as the periodic meetings between
workers and managers  or the annual shareholders' meeting? Even at the 1994 annual meeting,
which followed on  the  heels of  the  introduction of  the  three-day work  week and  the
announcement  of impending  layoffs, the questions  posed to the board were not confrontational.
Perhaps the language  of the bylaws, which does not clarify who has standing to bring
such charges, has discouraged potential lawsuits.  The more likely proximate cause is the
absence of individuals  or institutions  with the means and incentive  to instigate an investigation
or sue.  Arguably, SAZ itself (acting through the board) could bring a claim.  The board of
directors of SAZ has established committees to handle various issues, including an ethics
committee. In principle, this committee  should  be monitoring  potential  conflicts  of interest. In
"  Article  97-2 of the new Civil Code contemplates  a limitation  on the number  of shareholders  in a closed  joint-
stock company,  though  leaves the specifics  to the law on joint-stock  companies. If a company  exceeds  this limit,
then it must reconstitute  itself as an open  joint-stock  company  or face forced  liquidation. At this point, the law on
joint stock companies  is silent on the maximum  number of shareholders  permitted for a closed company.
40practice, however, the committee  has done little.  There was a great deal of energy surrounding
the committee  when it was first formed in the spring of 1993. Pamphlets setting forth ethical
standards  were gathered from a number  of Western  companies,  but interest dropped  off quickly.
During 1994 and 1995, the committee  rarely met, and took no formal actions.  Of course, the
membership of  the committee also undermined its ability and/or willingness to  act.  The
chairman  of the ethics committee  is the vice president for production; he is also a member of
the board.  Thus, it is difficult  to see how the committee  could assume a "watchdog"  function.
Shareholders  are also unlikely  to pursue  an action against  either managers  or directors, for many
of the reasons laid out above. Not only is there a conflict  of interest arising from insiders' dual
role  as  shareholder and  employee, but  precisely what remedies might be  available to
shareholders  who attempt to hold directors accountable  for breaches of fiduciary duty are not
clear.  Even if a shareholder  prevails, it might well be a empty victory, in that enforcement  is
unlikely. In sum, in a world of interlocking  self-dealing  and shareholders  beholden  to managers
for their jobs, who would initiate strong oversight  actions?
In sum, the motivation  for managerial  behavior  in SAZ is rarely influenced  by the letter
of the formal law, or even the requirements  implied  by SAZ's self-imposed  standards. Indeed,
there is little evidence of an underlying  respect for law or standards of any kind.  We do not
believe  that SAZ is unique  among  Russian  enterprises. It is responding  rationally  to the existing
legal framework  (still incomplete  and in flux), the institutions  that support and enforce it (still
in  their infancy), and the underlying incentives currently existing within insider-dominated
privatized firms.
41Summary  and Conclusions
This paper has attempted to lay out three fundamental  requirements  for the rule of law
to grow and flourish  in transitional  economies. These three requirements  include a reasonably
well-designed "supply" of  written laws,  a  functioning set of  institutions to  generate the
information  and take the actions necessary to enforce such laws, and market-based  incentives
for the actors involved to generate the "demand" for rule by law and the use of laws and
institutions  once they exist. The absence  of any one of the three requirements  introduces  major
distortions  and dooms  the system to inadequacy  if not utter failure. Laws or institutions  without
each other or without a supportive  framework of incentives  are likely to lie dormant, while
incentives  by themselves  will be frustrated  without  a reasonable  legal framework  and institutions
to support and enforce it.  The problem in transition settings is that all three must to a large
extent be created from scratch.  Not only must new laws be drafted (a daunting  task in and of
itself, but still perhaps the easiest  of the three), but they must be accompanied  by the growth of
supportive  institutions  (including  not only formal  judicial institutions  but also the "watchdog'
institutions  that we almost take for granted in advanced market economies)  and of economic
reforms -- whether privatization (particularly with outside owners) or banking reforms  -- that
separate  actors from the state and reinforce market-based  incentives.
Two case studies -- Hungarian bankruptcy law and Russian company law -- have been
used in the paper to illustrate the interaction of these three requirements in practice.  These
particular cases illustrate  our general view that Central Europe is somewhat  further along on all
42of these dimensions than Russia.  Quite well-designed  laws are in place in many commercial
areas, as evidenced by the Hungarian bankruptcy  example discussed in this paper, and the
presence of these laws is stimulating  the development  of the legal and commercial  institutions
needed to implement  them (among which, in this example, are courts, trustees, and banks).
Russia is not as advanced  in the development  of either laws or institutions,  among  other reasons
because  it lacked Hungary's pre-war  legacy and it started it economic  reforms much later. With
regard  to  incentives, in  both  cases  relevant  actors  exert  weaker  demand for  proper
implementation  of  the laws on the books than one would expect in  more mature market
economies. In the Hungarian  case, creditors' (particularly  banks') potential  demand  for a well-
functioning  bankruptcy  system has been arguably  weakened  by their ability to turn to the state
for recapitalization support rather than having to  depend for survival on  debt collection
mechanisms.  In the Russian case the demand for a corporate law with strong corporate
governance  potential and shareholder  protections  has been compromised  by the preponderance
of employee  ownership  and the resulting conflicts  of interest that make employee  shareholders
reticent to assert ownership  rights.  Yet here, also, Central Europe is further  along than Russia.
While Hungary may have lagged behind Poland and the Czech Republic in imposing tight
macroeconomic  policy and hard budget constraints on banks and enterprises, all three Central
European  countries  are still relatively  well-advanced  in implementing  these reforms, which  also
helps explain the arguably  greater "demand"  for rule of law in Central Europe than in Russia.
If  Russia can  continue to  tighten its  macroeconomic  policies and  impose harder budget
43constraints on firms, this may hasten the "degeneration" 52 of employee-owned  into outsider-
owned firms and thereby increase the demand for further development and enforcement of
company  law.
Yet it is not true that the "rule of law" is fully  developed  even in Hungary. In particular
there is still a long way to go in the development  of laws, institutions, incentives  and societal
norms needed  to impose  fiduciary  responsibility  on enterprise managers  and thus to limit insider
dealing and asset stripping, whether  in bankrupt  or in healthier  firms.  These fiduciary norms
are even more problematic  in Russia, as evidenced  by the SAZ case study discussed earlier.
Unlike  in Hungary, many  Russians  also seems  to have a fundamental  lack of respect  for law and
an almost total lack of confidence  in either law or legal institutions.
Finally our framework  and our cases belie any simplistic  notion that the rule of law can
be mechanically  dictated from above.  Indeed, there is constant tension  between the desire of
policy makers  to push social and legal change from above and the need to generate legal norms
from actual practice and acceptance  below.  But there is more the government can do than
simply  pass legislation;  its policies  can profoundly  affect incentives  and institutions  as well.  In
the case of bankruptcy  law in Hungary,  top-down  legislative  reform  appears  to have been  at least
marginally successful  in changing expectations  and behavior, in part because it stimulated  the
growth of new supporting  institutions. It might have been even more successful  if other areas
of government  policy had created more complementary  incentives,  particularly  in banks. In the
case of company  law in Russia, attempts  at top-down  legislative  reform  appear to have  been less
52  Earle  and  Estrin (1995).
44effective to date, in large part because of the almost complete absence of either supporting
institutions  or incentives for shareholder  monitoring. The hope is that the law on paper will
eventually become the law in practice as continued  economic  reforms move enterprises away
from dependence  on the state toward dependence  on the market.
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